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This posthumously published work by Prebisch 
poses the following question: What is ECLAC's atti-
tude on the topics of dependence, interdependence 
and development? In order to answer this question, 
Prebisch analyses a number of issues. 
First of all, he examines the role of the 
periphery and the weight of the dominant centres in 
various periods, taking into account some variables 
which help in the interpretation of the resulting 
development. An issue of great importance in this 
respect is that of the internal faults of peripheral 
development, including superficial imitation of 
external models and the low priority given to techni-
cal development. 
Secondly, Prebisch emphasizes the need to ana-
lyse peripheral capitalism within the context of a 
global theory of capitalist development, eschewing 
the danger of lapsing into intellectual dependence in 
this respect. Import substitution, he notes, was not 
invented by technocrats, but was a response to 
changing international conditions: there was never 
any bias against exports in ECLAC's thinking. The 
deterioration in the terms of trade, for its part, was 
due to technical change and its differential impact on 
industrial goods and primary commodities, 
In the last part of the article, Prebisch analyses 
various recipes formulated in the centres for the 
developing countries but not applied in the indus-
trial countries and emphasizes the need to achieve 
new world trading arrangements which will permit 
the countries of the periphery to advance in their 
development process. 
•This article is based on a lecture delivered by Dr. 
Prebisch at the Economic Development Centre of London 
University in 1986. It is to be published by Basil Blackwell, 





Among the burning questions of the 1960s were 
dependence theories and concern about the 
problems —longstanding, of course— which 
they brought to the fore. In retrospect, now that 
the ferment of ideas has settled, two broad 
approaches are discernible. One of these, corres-
ponding to more traditional thinking, identified 
the problem of dependence with the well-known 
hegemony of the stronger over the weaker coun-
tries; the dependence relation was seen as unilat-
eral and invariably negative, and was held 
responsible for all the ills of the periphery. The 
other school of thought took for granted the 
existence and the important implications of the 
said hegemony, and sought to advance a step 
farther by shedding light on its foundations and 
on its complex manifestations as they figured in 
the centre-periphery concept. Thus, for exam-
ple, one of the points emphasized was that the 
nature of the downward trend of the terms of 
trade clearly illustrated the disadvantageous 
position of the periphery. Later, the centre-
periphery concept gained much from the valu-
able contributions of sociologists, political 
scientists and economists who took pains to 
point out internal phenomena inherent to the 
periphery which strengthened dependence rela-
tions. In this connection, special mention should 
be made of the work of Fernando Cardoso and 
Enzo Faletto1 carried out under the aegis of 
ECLAC. 
What is the nature of ECLAC's thinking on 
this subject now, enriched as it has been by the 
aforesaid contributions? A reply to this question 
should be preceded by a review of the major 
changes in the situation that have taken place. 
First I will examine the part played by the 
periphery in capitalist development ¡n pre-
industrialization days. By the very dynamics of 
the centres, the periphery had been left on the 
'See Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y 
desarrollo en América Latina. Ensayo de interpretación socio-
lógica, Mexico City, Siglo XXI Editores, 1974, 166 pp. 
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sidelines of the industrializing process, in its 
appendicular role of producer and exporter of 
primary commodities. The benefits of the 
increase in productivity that technical progress 
in the centres brought in its train did not spread 
to the rest of the world through a fall in the 
prices of manufactured goods, but were felt in 
the centres themselves, with the augmentation 
of income, of demand for goods and services and 
of capital accumulation wherewith to satisfy it. 
Demand for primary goods produced by the 
periphery also expanded in this process, gener-
ally very fast, and the corresponding income 
increments were transferred back to the centres 
for the purchase of manufactured goods. 
This pattern began to crack up during the 
First World War. But the decisive impulse to 
industrialization stemmed mainly from the cri-
sis of the 1930s. It was not a doctrinaire require-
ment, but was imposed by unfavourable 
circumstances which likewise made import sub-
stitution a matter of necessity. In those days 
nobody could have dreamed of exporting manu-
factures to the centres; nor could anyone have 
done so during the Second World War or the 
difficult years of the postwar period. Later, how-
ever, these were succeeded by propitious times 
for the export of manufactures. Some of the 
countries of the region made good use of the 
offered opportunities, whereas others, such as 
Argentina, were unable to exploit them with 
sufficient drive and steadfastness of purpose. 
Because the periphery had not participated 
in industrialization from the start, large sectors 
of the population had been left out of the devel-
opment process, in consequence of the dynamics 
of the centres and the mutations and diversifica-
tion of demand. The periphery's demand for 
manufactured goods tends to increase rapidly, 
whereas its primary exports follow a relatively 
slow upward trend. There is an enormous dis-
parity between the central and the peripheral, 
countries as regards income from demand for 
imports. Hence the significance of exporting 
manufactures. As it happens, however, the 
manufactures that the periphery is in a position 
to export are precisely those for which the 
growth of demand in the centres is compara-
tively slow. This is why the centres not only 
display reluctance to do away with their protec-
tionism, but rather tend to accentuate it. The 
great liberalization of trade brought about by the 
Kennedy and Tokyo rounds of negotiations 
barely touched the periphery, since the goods 
covered were those for which demand gains 
impetus from the technological innovations 
introduced in the centres. The conclusion may 
therefore be reached that once again, the dynam-
ics of the centres does not afford anything like 
the same benefit to the periphery as to the cen-
tres themselves. I shall revert to this point later. 
I stated at the outset that the dependence 
controversy had enriched the centre-periphery 
concept. Perhaps its most important contribu-
tion has been the incorporation of power rela-
tions in the concept in question. In the course of 
the appendicular development of the periphery, 
the dominant groups in the centres had linked 
up with their counterparts in the periphery; 
there was a certain community of interests 
between these social groups, although the subor-
dinate position of those in the periphery was 
manifest. The hegemony of the centres, and 
especially of the main dynamic centre, was based 
on their economic, financial and technological 
superiority, on the fragmentation of the 
periphery, on the trend towards imbalance in 
trade, and on the aforesaid subordination or 
dependence, call it what you will. 
The superiority of the centres continued to 
make itself apparent during the industrialization 
of the periphery, and to take new forms. To the 
siphoning-off of income from the enterprises 
producing and exporting primary goods and 
importing manufactures, prior to industrializa-
tion, as well as from the public utility enter-
prises, was added the drainage of income 
through the transnational corporations, as they 
came to play a more and more active part in 
industrialization, often sheltering behind an 
exaggerated degree of protection. I do not, of 
course, exclude banking and financial corpora-
tions. Thus a change took place in the composi-
tion of the dominant peripheral groups linked 
up with the centres and a web of relations favou-
rable to their economic, political and strategic 
interests was woven. 
These are transparent or subtle ways in 
which the hegemonic weight of the centres 
makes itself felt. And when the periphery reacts 
against this dependence and jeopardizes the 
interests concerned, a whole constellation of 
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dominant elements in the centres loses no time 
in marshalling its forces to apply penal 
measures. 
A distinction, not always presented in clear 
and definite terms, should be drawn between 
these dependence phenomena and the nature of 
those centre-periphery relations, referred to 
above, which are the consequence of the time lag 
in the integral development of the periphery, of 
its economic, financial and technological infe-
riority and of its economic fragmentation. 
There is yet another body of ideas respecting 
dependence, among whose most significant 
expressions is the contention that the high level 
of living in the centres is basically due to syste-
matic exploitation of the periphery, through 
diverse forms of transfer of income to the cen-
tres, and through the deterioration of the terms 
of trade to the disadvantage of the periphery's 
primary products. I n the past there have 
undoubtedly been elements of exploitation to 
which ECLAC has repeatedly called attention, 
But this conclusion as to the peripheral origin of 
the centres' well-being overlooks the influence 
of the giant strides made by the latter in 
technology. 
It is therefore not surprising that some have 
gone so far as to recommend delinkage from the 
centres, a more or less drastic severance of rela-
tions with them, so that the periphery, by taking 
full advantage of its own potentialities, can give 
decisive impetus to its development. 
It is true that the centres, and above all the 
main dynamic centre of capitalism, have con-
cerned themselves with the development of the 
periphery only ín so far as it has served their own 
interests, and generally without looking very far 
ahead. They have sought neither the develop-
ment of the periphery in social depth nor formu-
las for a convergence of interests. 
It will take an immense and enlightened 
effort, a tenacious and protracted impulse of its 
own, to lift a peripheral country into a different 
category. This was what took place in the United 
States, until that country came to be the main 
dynamic centre. And in this way too Japan has 
become an exceptionally thriving centre, despite 
its lack of natural resources, other than the 
power of its mind and will. 
Their endeavours were not directed towards 
cutting off relations with the centres, but 
towards cultivating them intelligently in the 
interests of their own development. 
As a general rule, the above-mentioned 
school of thought has laid very little stress on the 
internal flaws in peripheral development. Just as 
the periphery displays a persistent trend 
towards external disequilibrium, so likewise it 
exhibits an internal dynamic imbalance between 
the rate of expenditure and the rate of accumula-
tion of reproductive capital, that is, the capital 
indispensable for the multiplication of employ-
ment, productivity and total income in the econ-
omy. This imbalance brings to light, especially in 
the Latin American region of the periphery, a 
fundamental defect. 
With a lower average productivity than that 
of the centres, we hurry to imitate their ways of 
life, to boost demand for diversified goods and 
services. Thus a privileged consumer society has 
grown up in those social strata that are best able 
to appropriate the fruits of technical progress, to 
the obvious detriment of reproductive capital 
investment. And in the course of the structural 
changes in society, with the development of the 
distributive power of the labour force, its private 
and social consumption gradually increased as 
well, while at the same time the State considera-
bly raised its own civil and military expenditure. 
These outlays do not entail any containment 
of the expenditure of the well-to-do strata, con-
stantly stimulated as it is by technological inno-
vations, but are superadded to their privileged 
consumer spending. Sooner or later this adver-
sely affects the rate of reproductive capital 
accumulation, with the consequent ill-effects on 
the tempo of development and on distributive 
equity. And this dynamic imbalance inevitably 
ends in a new type of inflation which cannot be 
effectively combated by monetary restriction 
which, moreover, is counterproductive by reason 
of its economic, social and political 
consequences. 
The fact that all these forms of expenditure 
—private and social, civil and military— consti-
tute a manifest imitation of the centres might 
induce the theorists of the above-mentioned 
stream of opinion to blame dependence likewise 
for the weakening of the rate of accumulation 
and for its inflationary effects: a conclusion 
which would imply carrying delinkage to an 
extreme hardly conceivable in the praxis of 
development. 
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II 
Intellectual dependence 
I also want to refer to another conspicuous 
symptom of dependence. I mean the uncondi-
tional subordination of some circles in the 
periphery to theories worked out in the centres. I 
do not mean to deny the value of these theories, 
but I maintain that generally speaking they are 
not in keeping with the peripheral situation that 
I have attempted to describe in a number of 
studies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
concept of periphery should be regarded as a 
mere change of name, or that it should be attrib-
uted to the design of the countries concerned to 
formulate a theory of their own which differs 
from the thinking of the centres. Nothing of the 
sort: the phenomena of peripheral capitalism 
must be inserted in a global theory of capitalist 
development. I feel it is very important to clear 
up this point in order to dispel misconceptions. 
When the force of international circumstan-
ces first began to drive the periphery into 
becoming industrialized, an attack was launched 
in the centres against the very idea of this delib-
erate industrialization, based on protection and 
on import substitution. It is worth while to recall 
this, for despite the time that has gone by, substi-
tution is still being attacked as a sort of mon-
strosity spawned by ECLAC. 
I remember how in the early 1950s Professor 
Jacob Viner took up the cudgels against us in the 
University of Rio de Janeiro, attributing to us the 
fantastic idea that agriculture was symbolic of 
poverty. Shortly afterwards I had an opportunity 
of retorting. How could I uphold such an idea if 
my country, Argentina, had attained, thanks to 
agriculture, an extremely high level of per capita 
income at the beginning of the present century? 
Instead of becoming industrialized, Professor 
Viner said, what ought to be done was to intro-
duce technical progress into agricultural activi-
ties, in order to step up productivity and expand 
exports. I agree, said I ¡n my turn, but technical 
progress in agriculture would leave redundant 
manpower. And it was for industry, as for other 
activities that develop alongside it, to perform, 
among other roles, that of absorbing this 
redundant labour force at rising levels of produc-
tivity. Otherwise, there was a risk of expanding 
primary exports beyond what was called for by 
the growth of international demand, with the 
consequent deterioration of the terms of trade. 
Protection of industry would help to rechannel 
capital and labour from agricultural to industrial 
activities, counteracting the downward trend in 
question. The fact that there has been exaggera-
tion and abuse of protection does not invalidate 
this thesis. Although this has indeed happened, 
and in certain cases —and once again I will cite 
Argentina— it has been prejudicial to agricul-
ture and exports. 
The theoretical defence of an appropriate 
degree of protection was very simple. In view of 
the excessively low income-elasticity of interna-
tional demand for agricultural products —and 
also for primary products in general— the 
expansion of exports of such goods was apt to 
depress upon their relative prices. Protection 
was desirable if the increase in costs for a country 
turned out to be less than the losses caused by the 
fall in prices of agricultural products. 
But that was not the end of the argument. 
Imports had to be replaced by domestic produc-
tion and, at the same time, the export of manu-
factures had to be undertaken and encouraged by 
incentives similar to those accorded to import 
substitution for the home market. I believe that 
ECLAC was among the first to defend this thesis 
in a study presented to the governments a quar-
ter of a century ago. The tenor of the relevant 
passage was as follows: 
The need for import substitution and for 
consequent protection of substitution activities 
has been unavoidable. But there has been a fail-
ure to boost exports to the same extent. There 
has been discrimination in favour of industrial 
substitution and against exports, mainly indus-
trial exports. The ideal policy would have been to 
promote exports in order to place them on an 
equal footing again with substitution activities, 
which does not necessarily mean equal 
incentives. 
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This aspect is sufficiently important to merit 
examination; in a nutshell, it is the following. 
Limitation of external demand for primary 
exports makes it necessary to devote part of the 
increase in the factors of production to substitu-
tion activities. As their productivity is lower 
than in the industrial centres, they need to be 
given a certain subsidy in the form of tariff 
protection. Yet there would be possibilities of 
using a smaller subsidy todevelop new industrial 
export activities, whereby a greater quantity of 
industrial goods could be obtained through trade 
than those that could be manufactured by substi-
tution production. 
By subsidizing substitution production 
rather than production intended for new exports 
(industrial or primary), export opportunities 
have been lost which, had they been properly 
used, would have reduced the scope of substitu-
tion policy or made more rapid economic growth 
possible.2 
ECLAC emphasized the fact that industriali-
zation was asymmetrical: besides being based on 
a generally excessive degree of protection, it 
failed to provide the appropriate stimulus to 
encourage exports of manufactures. And yet it 
was repeatedly affirmed that ECLAC ignored the 
need to combine import substitution and exports 
of manufactures. 
And now that I have mentioned Professor 
Viner, I will also refer to Professor Bela Balassa, 
who has always reproached us with having over-
looked the need to bring about that combination. 
And what is more serious, in a recent report he 
ascribes to this supposed onesidedness of ECLAC 
all the ¡Us of Latin American development.' 
Obviously he has had only a nodding 
acquaintance with our work, based on second-
and third-hand quotations, in general mutilated 
and incomplete. For instance, he refers to a para-
graph in the 1961 study of mine to which I 
JSee Raúl Prebisch, "Economic development or monetary 
stability: the false dilemma", in Economic Bulletin for Latin Amer-
tea, vol. VI, No. 1, Santiago, Chile, i-Cl.AC, March 1961, reproduced 
in A. Gurrieri, La obra de Prebisch en la CEPAt, Mexico City, Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, 1982, vol. 11, p. 19. 
'See R, Prebisch, "Notes on trade from the standpoint of the 
periphery", ŒPAL Review No. 28 (LC/G.1Ï92), Santiago Chile, 
April 1986. 
alluded above, and in which I denounced exorbi-
tant protection, but does not include my recom-
mendation that exports should be combined 
with import substitution in broader markets 
than those of the individual countries concerned. 
Nevertheless, I am glad that Professor Balassa 
has at last come to share my opinion. And I hope 
that in the study which he is preparing on Latin 
American development he will remedy his 
omission. 
If I allude to this case it is not only because of 
the influence that Professor Balassa wields in the 
World Bank, for which he acts in an advisory 
capacity, but also because he is representative of 
certain attitudes that would appear to reflect 
displeasure at our —at ECLAC's—endeavours to 
interpret peripheral development phenomena 
in the light of a criterion of our own. Generally 
speaking, no genuine effort is made to under-
stand ideas before attacking them. No recogni-
tion has been accorded to our determination to 
free ourselves from a persistent intellectual 
dependence which has serious effects on devel-
opment praxis. 
Since the earliest days of ECLAC —to adduce 
an important example— no objective considera-
tion has been given to our theoretical reasons for 
maintaining that, in consequence of technical 
progress, there was a trend towards deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade. We have said so 
already: if the increase in productivity raised 
production above demand, such a downward 
trend would occur. Why did not the same thing 
happen in respect of manufactured goods? 
Simply because when deterioration supervened, 
the flexibility of industry was conducive to a 
redeployment of capital and labour in response 
to the diversified demand that technological 
innovations always bring in their train. But 
where agricultural products are concerned, this 
does not take place, except to a limited degree. It 
was contended, then, that deterioration was a 
mere illusion. The price of diversified goods rose 
because of the improvement in their quality and 
efficiency; if a farmer had to pay a higher price 
for a tractor, it was on that account. However, 
deterioration does not occur when for similar 
reasons the price of a machine used by industrial 
producers goes up. It does not occur, because 
diversification (together with other factors) pre-
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vents prices of industrial goods as a whole from 
falling as productivity rises. Herein lies the fun-
damental difference between agricultural and 
industrial prices, which is of so much importance 
for the development of the periphery. 
As regards other primary products, there are 
cases in which, in addition to the adverse effects 
of the aforesaid trend, demand is also weakened 
as a result of the technological innovations 
which replace a natural product by new indus-
trial goods. Technical progress thus operates 
adversely at both extremes. Adversely for the 
periphery, but not for the centres. 
The peripheral countries do not have the 
same possibilities of counteracting the trend 
towards deterioration as the United States do, by 
restricting production of grain, or as the Euro-
pean Economic Community does, by flooding 
the world market with the production surpluses 
caused by the fixing of high prices, to the serious 
detriment of other producer countries, especially 
those of the periphery. And nevertheless, critics 
of the deterioration theory still go on insisting 
that it is a fallacy. 
This double standard of judgement is by no 
means uncommon. We are seeing it now applied 
to protection. The periphery has been impugned 
on account of the protection it accords to the 
production of manufactures. There is no deny-
ing, of course, that its costs, at least to begin with, 
are higher than those incurred in the centres, 
because of the latter's economic and technical 
superiority. Why not devaluate, is the cry, 
instead of resorting to measures that represent 
arbitrary inteference with market laws? Deva-
luation, however, would mean, cheapening the 
prices of primary products which have come to 
be internationally competitive, and this, which, 
while benefiting the centres, has unfavourable 
effects upon the development of the periphery. 
By the centres, then, as already said, we have 
been persistently counselled to export manufac-
tures instead of undertaking import substitution. 
Some peripheral countries have followed the 
advice, acquiring the necessary technology and 
exporting goods which, thanks to that acquisi-
tion and to lower wages, compete favourably 
with goods from the centres. These then resort 
to protection. Why are they not advised to deval-
uate in order to cope with the problem? I think 
commonsense considerations prevail: among 
others, the realization that such a measure 
brings down the prices of their competitive 
exports, with the ensuing loss of some of the 
fruits of their technical progress. 
The effects of all this intellectual depend-
ence have generally been very serious, owing to 
the academic authority that is usually attributed 
to the advocates of certain ways of thinking. The 
damage is still fresh that has been done by the 
so-called Chicago theories in several Latin 
American countries, especially my own. All the 
more so when these theories become operative, 
as in the conspicuous case of the International 
Monetary Fund. This institution took several 
years to recognize that external imbalances 
stemmed not only from an inappropriate inter-
nal monetary expansion, but also from interna-
tional factors, as we in ECLAC have long been 
maintaining. And in face of thesedisequilibria,a 
squeeze on economic activity is recommended in 
order to reduce imports, since respect for market 
laws discountenances the pursuit of a selective 
import policy. The economic, social and political 
effects of such a squeeze do not seem to have 
entered into the picture as far as the Fund is 
concerned, much less import substitution policy, 
which it has resolutely impugned. 
Very serious, too, have been the consequen-
ces of resorting to monetary contraction as a 
means of combat inflation: an efficacious for-
mula in those bygone days of capitalism when 
the labour force bowed to market laws and the 
State took a laissez faire line with respect to 
income distribution. To avoid, or at least attenu-
ate, such extreme monetarism, an indispensable 
requisite would be an income policy which 
accorded capital accumulation the importance it 
deserves. The Fund did once mention this idea, 
but unfortunately it would seem to have con-
tinued to adhere to its inveterate orthodoxy. 
Another measure now advocated is the 
reduction of imports in order to cope with the 
payment of interest on the external debt, very 
greatly to the detriment of internal activity and 
employment. It must be recognized that the 
Fund is not responsible for the debt. It was 
simply ignored when the large banks, guided by 
the profit-making motives, availed themselves 
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of the plentiful resources of the Eurodollar 
market to issue loans to countries that took those 
resources without even an elementary degree of 
foresight. There was a convergence of irrespon-
sibilities on both sides, except in so far as an 
attempt was made to face up to the petroleum 
shock. The private banks loudly asserted the 
worth of their own wisdom and of market laws 
in respect of resource allocation, and made much 
of their superiority over intergovernmental 
institutions. 
It is playing with fire to shy away from a 
political solution for the debt problem. To all the 
foregoing have been added the deterioration of 
the terms of trade and the increasing difficulties 
of expanding exports in present circumstances. 
The Baker Plan signified an acknowledgement 
of the political character of the problem. But it 
can be only a beginning, as long as astronomi-
cally high interest rates continue to prevail. The 
debt has accentuated our countries' dependence. 
The financial factor has always been outstand-
ingly important, and now it is still more so in 
countries whose capital accumulation has plum-
meted, above all because of the inflationary crisis 
and debt service payments, and which are going 
to need foreign capital. Hence the necessity of a 
political arrangement which, besides resolving 
the problem, will pave the way for a selective 
investment policy. 
I have spoken of dependence. But not of interde-
pendence. We are all interdependent but some 
are less interdependent than others, as in the 
case of Orwell's equality in which some are less 
equal than others. 
Interdependence may be positive or nega-
tive. And in it the role of the dynamic centre is of 
primordial importance. A vigorous and sus-
tained expansion of this latter would spread its 
positivé effects over the rest of the world, and 
especially in the countries of the periphery, if 
they made up their minds to respond energeti-
cally to the stimulus thus provided. But other-
The foregoing considerations bring us to the 
subject of conditionality. Conditionality is a req-
uisite of international credit operations. But 
what sort of conditionality? This question must 
be posed now that the World Bank is talking of 
conditionality too. True, it has not been observed 
by those private banks I have just mentioned. 
Conditionality ought not to consecrate our 
dependence upon the thinking of the centres; on 
the contrary, its content should be discussed with 
the participation of independent economists 
from the periphery, until a reasonable body of 
ideas were arrived at to guide the action of the 
above-mentioned institutions, as well as that of 
the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Similarly, conditionality could have con-
structive meaning only in the framework of a 
clear-cut policy of economic expansion. And that 
necessitates highly significant changes. Interna-
tional financial co-operation, however liberal 
and enlightened it might be, would not have 
lasting positive effects on the peripheral coun-
tries unless these took effective measures to cor-
rect the tendency for the growth rate of 
expenditure to outstrip that of reproductive 
investment. Nor would these effects be fully 
brought about unless measures were likewise 
taken to correct the trend towards external dis-
equilibrium. Herein líes the key role of the cen-
tres, especially the main dynamic centre. 
wise, if the growth of the centre were weak and 
fluctuating, a disturbing case of negative interde-
pendence would occur. 
I do not say that a peripheral country would 
have no means of attenuating the adverse conse-
quences, but it would not be able to counteract 
them altogether. And in so far as, whatever its 
intentions, it was unable to expand its exports at 
an adequate pace, it would find itself obliged to 
push its import substitution policy farther than 
would otherwise have been necessary. 
Would this import substitution policy be 
prejudicial to the centres? It would merely 
HI 
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change the composition, not the quantity of 
imports from them, the growth of which would 
have to keep pace with the rate of development.4 
It is an interesting case of asymmetry which ¡s 
seldom clearly understood. The imbalance, as we 
have already explained, is basically due to the 
disparity caused by the relatively slow growth 
rate of primary exports as compared with that of 
imports of diversified goods, which is relatively 
rapid. If, then, a peripheral country substitutes 
domestic production for certain imports it 
implies increasing others. Contrariwise, when it 
is the main centre, primarily, that does the same 
thing and restricts its imports, it deprives the 
peripheral countries of the means of continuing 
to import as much as or more than before, with 
the consequent slackening of the rate of 
development. 
Readily understandable, therefore, is the 
adverse significance of the waning rate of devel-
opment of the centres in these days, aggravated 
as it is by the recrudescence of an inveterate 
protectionism. Multilateral formulas will have 
to be devised which will enable the peripheral 
countries to share, without disturbances, in the 
increase in the centres' consumption, as long as 
their persistent unemployment situation pre-
cludes measures of more far-reaching scope. Be 
that as it may: could it be contended that this 
would provide a solution in depth for the prob-
lem of disequilibrium? 
Those of us who remain unconvinced must 
continue insisting upon the need to combine 
exports with import substitution. It is to be 
hoped that understanding on the part of the 
centres and emancipation of the periphery from 
its intellectual dependence will facilitate the 
application of this policy. 
Import substitution will impel our countries 
to undertake new lines of production which will 
4Anibal Pinto, the eminent Latin American economist who 
has contributed so much to the evolvement of ECLAC's ideas, in a 
study published under the title "La apertura al exterior en la 
América Latina", in El Trimestre Económico, No. 187, Mexico 
City, July-September 1980, expressed theopinion that Latin Amer-
ica, if it were to keep up until the year 2000 the growth rate of 6.4% 
recorded between the years 1955 and 1974, would have to double its 
imports every 10 years. Thus it is not a question of reducing 
imports but of increasing them and making the appropriate 
changes in their composition, in accordance with the demands of 
development. 
call for technological co-operation from the 
advanced centres. This will open up a promising 
field for exploitation of a technology which the 
centres have already developed, and which they 
are improving upon by virtue of new forward 
strides in technology. 
An indispensable condition for the success of 
this policy would be for those new lines of pro-
duction, those changes in its structure, to have 
access to broader markets than those of the indi-
vidual countries. We have hammered at the cen-
tres' doors to obtain a favourable reception for 
our exports. But we have not been able to pro-
mote them among ourselves. Here too formulas 
must be found that are more effective than those 
conceived a quarter of a century ago. 
For the first time in capitalist development, 
the periphery —passive hitherto— could exert 
dynamic influence on the centres, always provid-
ing that new forms of co-operation were arrived 
at. Expanding exports of goods based on a less 
advanced technology than that of the centres and 
exchanging them for more complex goods would 
mean that both parties obtained well-recognized 
advantages with the consequent increase in pro-
ductivity. While exploitation in the periphery of 
a technology that is being constantly improved 
upon in the centres would also offer undeniable 
reciprocal benefits. 
It has been said elsewhere that the centres 
have concerned themselves with peripheral 
development only just so far as it suited their 
interests. No one can blame them. We ought to 
blame ourselves for not having been able to 
shake off the intellectual dependence which has 
blindfolded us to our own interests. We have, 
however, come to a stage in our relations with 
the centres at which there are great possibilities 
that a convergence of interests may be reached. 
These converging interests, however, are 
not only economic, but also political, and of vital 
importance. Our Latin American countries —to 
continue confining ourselves to them— are 
passing through an acute structural crisis whose 
implications are plain to be seen. To the problem 
of the broad masses of human beings that have 
been relegated to the bottom of the social struc-
ture at very precarious income levels, is now 
superadded the question of unemployment and a 
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growing distributive struggle, which inevitably 
leads to inflation and in some instances to hyper-
inflation. The life horizon of the new genera-
tions is narrowing and their dynamic elements 
have a profound sense of frustration which sows 
potent seeds of resentment and rebellion. The 
problem, however, is not so much one of foreign 
ideologies, but one of a hotbed of violence of 
every kind. The political orientation is of course 
important. But much more so is the inherent 
likelihood of a perturbation of social coexistence 
and of the democratization process. 
The hegemonic power of the United States 
is a fact which it is not in our hands to alter. It can 
be exerted in two ways; one is to allow Latin 
American events to drift along and confront the 
consequent disturbances with penal measures or 
the use of force; the alternative is to pursue a 
far-sighted and enlightened policy of positive 
interdependence. There is no other choice. 
